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Abstract
We present a model that helps explain several past collapses of securitization markets.
Originators issue too many informationally insensitive securities in good times, blunting
investor incentives to become informed. The resulting endogenous scarcity of informed
investors exacerbates primary market collapses in bad times. Ine¢ ciency arises because
informed investors are a public good from the perspective of originators. All originators
bene￿t from the presence of additional informed investors in bad times, but each originator
minimizes his reliance on costly informed capital in good times by issuing safe securities.
Our model suggests regulations that limit the issuance of safe securities in good times.
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the ideas in this paper.1 Introduction
Many accounts of the rise of securitization argue that tranching ￿manufacturing claims with
di⁄erent degrees of seniority ￿helps economize on information production costs.1 Without
tranching, many investors would have incentives to produce information about asset cash ￿ ows.
While information production helps allocate capital e¢ ciently, duplicating it across many in-
vestors may be ine¢ cient.
Tranching cash ￿ ows into senior and junior securities helps minimize such duplication. In-
formationally insensitive senior securities (i.e., AAA-rated senior tranches) are nearly riskless,
so investors can hold them without expending signi￿cant resources on information acquisition.
Information production can then be carried out by a handful of specialized investors who hold
informationally sensitive junior securities (equity tranches), and duplication is minimized.
However, as noted by Gorton (2008a,b), economizing on information production costs in
good times may set the stage for market collapses in bad times, when the scope for adverse
selection rises dramatically. Indeed, while the recent ￿nancial crisis provides the most prominent
example, primary markets for near-riskless securities have su⁄ered numerous shutdowns in the
last 40 years as we discuss below. This suggests that instability could be a general characteristic
of markets for near-riskless securities, not just a one-time problem associated with the recent
subprime mortgage crisis. The critical question is whether these shutdowns are ine¢ cient. Since
bad states are rare, the bene￿ts of economizing on information production in good times could
outweigh the costs of collapse in bad times.
We present a model in which ine¢ cient collapses arise from the interaction between issuer
security design decisions and investor information acquisition decisions. Securitization blunts
investor incentives to build the ￿information production infrastructure￿needed to analyze se-
curitization cash ￿ ows. For an investment fund to produce information about a securitization,
it must have databases of historical loan performance, Monte Carlo models to simulate asset
cash ￿ ows, and highly trained analysts. This infrastructure is costly to build and has limited
value when most securities are informationally insensitive. Securitization helps economize on in-
frastructure costs by allowing issuers to create informationally insensitive securities that do not
require analysis. However, privately optimal securitization can produce an excessive amount of
informationally insensitive securities in good times, endogenously resulting in ine¢ ciently low
levels of information infrastructure, which exacerbates collapses in bad times.
In our model, originators wish to ￿nance positive NPV loan pools using securitization.
Speci￿cally, each originator raises ￿nancing by issuing a combination of debt and equity backed
by his loan pool in the primary market. Prior to this ￿nancing decision, investors may make an
irreversible decision to build information production infrastructure. The number of investors
who choose to build infrastructure is the key endogenous variable in the model. Investors who
1See, for example, Gorton and Pennacchi (1990), Du¢ e and DeMarzo (1999), DeMarzo (2005), Gorton
(2008a,b), Dang, Gorton, and Holmstrom (2010).
1choose not to build infrastructure (the ￿uninformed￿ ) may face adverse selection when they
trade with investors who do build infrastructure (the ￿informed￿ ) in the secondary market.
However, unlike the uninformed, the informed must in equilibrium earn su¢ cient pro￿ts to
recoup their up-front costs of building infrastructure.
Through the informational sensitivity of the securities they issue, originators control the
pro￿ts that informed investors earn. In good times, di⁄erences in loan pool payo⁄s are relatively
small, so the scope for adverse selection is low. Thus, originators can primarily ￿nance their
loan pools by issuing informationally insensitive debt, which leaves informed investors with
little ability to earn pro￿ts. This in turn discourages investors from building information
infrastructure ex ante.
In bad times, however, the payo⁄s on bad pools fall and the scope for adverse selection in-
creases. This signi￿cantly reduces the amount of funding originators can raise from uninformed
investors. Informed investors, by contrast, are relatively immune to adverse selection problems.
They are a robust source of capital in bad times, but there are relatively few of them. Thus,
even though the average loan pool is still positive NPV, loan origination collapses because it
becomes constrained by the limited amount of informed capital already in place.
In contrast to much of the previous work on security design and adverse selection, the
private market outcome can be ine¢ cient in our model because of a ￿nancing friction: the
full surplus associated with loan pools cannot be pledged to informed investors. This friction,
which can be motivated by moral hazard considerations, means that the private returns to
becoming informed may be lower than the social returns. This implies that the number of
investors who endogenously choose to become informed can be ine¢ ciently low in the private
market equilibrium. The key point of our paper is that even though informed investors create
adverse selection problems, it may be optimal to encourage, rather than discourage, their entry
because they are a robust source of capital in bad times.
A social planner can overcome the ￿nancing friction and increase total surplus by regulating
originator capital structure decisions to increase the issuance of risky, informationally sensitive
securities from which informed investors can pro￿t in good times. Intuitively, such regulations
are ￿in-kind￿subsidies to informed investors: originators sacri￿ce a small portion of their pro￿ts
in good times to encourage more investors to become informed. The small sacri￿ce in good
times is more than o⁄set by the gains in bad times, so regulation raises expected originator
surplus.
There are two ways to increase the informational sensitivity of securities issued by orig-
inators. First, limiting the issuance of informationally insensitive debt in good times would
raise the demand for informed capital to purchase equity in the primary market, increasing the
returns to being informed. This would induce more investors to become informed ex ante and
alleviate underfunding in bad times. Alternatively, constraining originators to issue riskier debt
in good times would raise the adverse selection pro￿ts available to informed investors trading
in the secondary market, again increasing the incentives to become informed ex ante.
2By contrast, in the private market equilibrium, each originator takes the information produc-
tion infrastructure of investors as ￿xed. Each ￿nds it privately optimal to issue informationally
insensitive debt in good times. These decisions collectively reduce the supply of informationally
sensitive securities that informed investors can pro￿t from, dulling ex ante incentives to become
informed and exacerbating the underfunding problem in bad times.
Why is the private market unable to overcome the ￿nancing friction on its own? The an-
swer lies in two problems: a commitment problem and an externality. First, originators cannot
commit to limiting their use of informationally insensitive debt in good times. Before it is
known whether times will be good or bad, originators recognize that they would bene￿t from
additional information infrastructure if the bad state occurs. From this ex ante perspective,
originators would like to commit to issuing securities that encourage investors to become in-
formed. However, once the good state is realized, originators maximize their pro￿ts by issuing
large amounts of informationally insensitive debt. Anticipating originator behavior, investors
limit their up-front investment in information infrastructure.
The second problem is an externality. An individual originator who issued informationally
sensitive securities in good times would induce investors to build additional information in-
frastructure ex ante. However, that particular originator would not necessarily receive funding
from informed investors in bad times. Thus, infrastructure is a public good from the perspective
of originators: it has di⁄use costs in good times and concentrated (rival and non-excludable)
bene￿ts in bad times. As a result, it is optimal for originators to avoid the higher costs of issuing
informationally sensitive securities to informed investors in good times. Ine¢ cient underfund-
ing of loan pools in bad times can arise if either the commitment problem or the externality
exists.
The assumption that information infrastructure, once endogenously chosen by investors, is
￿xed in the short term is crucial. Neither problem would exist if investors could make state-
contingent infrastructure decisions. The assumption that infrastructure is ￿xed in the short
run captures two ideas. First, ￿nancial capital may be slow-moving, so it might take time
for informed investors to raise capital in bad times. Second, it takes time and resources to
build new analytical capabilities, so uninformed investors cannot easily become informed in
bad times.
The mechanism in our model is not the ￿re-sales channel of Diamond and Rajan (2011),
Shleifer and Vishny (2010), and Stein (2012). While ￿re sales no doubt play an important role in
many market breakdowns, our model emphasizes a di⁄erent channel. In our model, the collapse
of the primary market for securitizations is not due to attractive investment opportunities in
the secondary market or anticipation of such opportunities in the future. Instead, it is driven
by a ￿buyers￿strike￿among the uninformed investors upon whom the primary market normally
relies. These uninformed investors simply move to the sidelines in bad times because they fear
adverse selection and lack the infrastructure necessary to produce information about asset cash
￿ ows.
3Thus, unlike ￿re-sales models, where the capital structure decisions of leveraged investors
may create externalities, in our model the capital structure decisions of originators themselves
are the problem. As a result, our model suggests that policies designed to limit ￿re sales, like
haircut regulation, may not be su¢ cient to reduce the fragility of securitization markets. It
may also be desirable to regulate the capital structures of securitization trusts by limiting the
amount of AAA-rated debt that can be issued in good times.
Our paper sits at the intersection of the literatures on security design and endogenous
information acquisition. Much of the security design and optimal capital structure literature,
including Myers and Majluf (1984), Gorton and Pennacchi (1990), Du¢ e and DeMarzo (1999),
Bolton and Freixas (2000), DeMarzo (2005), Dang, Gorton, and Holmstrom (2010), Chelma
and Hennessy (2010), and Pagano and Volpin (2010), takes investor composition as given and
focuses on minimizing the costs of adverse selection. In contrast, we consider the e⁄ects of
security design on the ex ante information infrastructure decisions of investors. In this regard,
our work is related to the literature on endogenous participation, including Grossman and
Stiglitz (1980), Merton (1987), Allen and Gale (1994), and Boot and Thakor (1997).
Moreover, in previous work the bene￿t provided by informed investors is typically an im-
provement in the real investment decisions of ￿rms. In contrast, we highlight a novel bene￿t
of informed investors: they are a robust source of capital capable of analyzing investment op-
portunities and ￿nancing positive NPV projects even in bad times. In our model the privately
optimal capital structure decisions of issuers may endongenously result in an ine¢ cient shortage
of information infrastructure.
This also distinguishes our paper from the recent work of Coval, Jurek, and Sta⁄ord
(2009a,b) and Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny (2011), who argue that neglected risks explain
the collapse of securitization markets in recent years. In contrast, we emphasize how ￿nancial
innovations that create near-riskless securities encourage investors to rationally choose to be un-
informed. Our results suggest that learning from prior mistakes will not necessarily eliminate
the instabilities associated with near-riskless securities.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the basic idea by sketching
the outlines of the model. Section 3 presents the full model, solving for the private market
equilibrium and the social planner￿ s solution. Section 4 discusses the distinctive empirical
implications of our model. Section 5 concludes. An Internet Appendix accompanying this
paper contains several extensions and descriptions of several past instances of shutdowns in
markets for near-riskless securities.
2 The Basic Idea
In this section we highlight the key message of the paper using a simpli￿ed outline of the model,
which abstracts from the informational asymmetries that underpin the model and presents the
basic ine¢ ciency in reduced form. There are continuums of two types of agents: originators
4and investors. There are two periods, t = 0;1. Investors make their information infrastructure
decisions at t = 0. At t = 1, one of two possible states S 2 fL;Hg (low or high) will be realized
and then originators will try to raise ￿nancing for projects. The probability that the state is
high is Pr[S = H] = p.
The continuum of originators has unit mass. Each originator has zero wealth and has access
to an indivisible project that requires an investment of $1 at t = 1. The expected value of
projects is VS in state S and we assume VH > VL > 1￿ i.e., projects are more attractive in the
H state but are still positive NPV in the L state.
There is an in￿nite mass of investors. If they wish to be informed t = 1, investors must pay
an infrastructure cost c at t = 0. The ￿nite mass of investors who choose to become informed is
denoted K. K is the key endogenous variable to be determined in equilibrium. Critically, the
number of informed investors is chosen at t = 0 and cannot be conditioned on the realization
of the state S at t = 1.
Being informed allows investors to capture rents from originators. Once the state S has
been realized at t = 1, originators try to raise capital from investors. To raise ￿nancing,
each originator makes a capital structure decision dS that results in a state-dependent transfer
￿S (dS) to informed investors. In the full model, these transfers are generated by Modigliani-
Miller (1958) violations arising from asymmetric information, which allow informed investors
to capture part of the project surplus from originators. Here we simply take ￿S (dS) as given.
The total payo⁄ of originators in state S is VS ￿ 1 ￿ ￿S (dS). Obviously, originators choose
d￿
S = argmin￿S (dS) to minimize the transfers. For simplicity, we assume that ￿S (d) is a
convex function so the optimal capital structure d￿
S satis￿es ￿0
S (d￿
S) = 0.
Finally, assume that originators must raise some ￿nancing from informed investors, implying
that the number of projects can be limited by the mass of informed investors, K. In particular,
assume that all projects will be undertaken in the high state (S = H) but that only fraction
NL (K) ￿ 1 of projects will be undertaken in the L state. This assumption captures the idea
that informed investors are a robust source of capital, able to provide ￿nancing in the L state
but in limited supply, and we show that it holds in the full model in Section 3. Naturally, we
have N0
L (K) > 0 so more projects are undertaken in the low state at t = 1 when there are more
informed investors.
2.1 Private Market Equilibrium
In the private market equilibrium, the mass of investors, K￿, who choose to become informed
is pinned down by the following zero pro￿t condition
cK
￿ = p ￿ ￿H (d
￿
H) + (1 ￿ p) ￿ ￿L (d
￿
L) ￿ NL (K
￿),
5which must hold from an ex ante (t = 0) perspective. ￿S (d￿
S) is the transfer from originators
to informed investors per project that is funded in state S, so aggregate transfers in state S are
equal to the number of projects undertaken times ￿S (d￿
S). The ex ante welfare of originators
is
W = p(VH ￿ 1 ￿ ￿H (d
￿
H)) + (1 ￿ p)(VL ￿ 1 ￿ ￿L (d
￿
L))NL (K
￿).
Using the zero pro￿t condition of investors, we can rewrite this as
W = p(VH ￿ 1) + (1 ￿ p)(VL ￿ 1)NL (K
￿) ￿ cK
￿
Originators bear the full information infrastructure costs of investors since investors earn zero
pro￿ts. As a result, all that matters from the ex ante perspective of originators is the probability
of obtaining funding in the bad state, NL (K), and the total information cost incurred by
investors, cK.
2.2 The Planner￿ s Intervention
Can a planner improve on the private market outcome? Consider interventions that alter H-
state capital structure decisions dH while holding L-state decisions ￿xed at dL = d￿
L. The
planner recognizes that such interventions can increase the number of informed investors in the
market. Intuitively, originators pick d￿
H to minimize their transfer to investors ￿H (dH). So
by changing dH in either direction, the planner increases total transfers to informed investors.
This boosts the incentive to become informed ex ante.
Formally, for a given level of dH the equilibrium number of informed investors K￿ satis￿es
the zero pro￿t condition: p ￿ ￿H (dH) + (1 ￿ p) ￿ ￿L (d￿
L) ￿ NL (K￿) = cK￿. Thus, changing dH
changes the number of informed investors by
@K￿
@dH
=
p ￿ ￿0
H (dH)
c ￿ (1 ￿ p) ￿ ￿L (d￿
L) ￿ N0
L (K￿)
.
Under the assumption that c > (1 ￿ p)￿￿L (d￿
L)￿N0
L (K￿), we have @K￿=@dH < 0 for dH < d￿
H
and @K￿=@dH > 0 for dH > d￿
H because ￿H (dH) is convex and is minimized when dH = d￿
H.
In other words, more investors will become informed at t = 0 as the planner either raises dH
above d￿
H or lowers dH below d￿
H.
How does such an intervention impact the ex ante welfare of originators? We have
@W
@K￿ = (1 ￿ p)(VL ￿ 1)N
0
L (K
￿) ￿ c.
The marginal bene￿t of having more informed investors is that N0
L (K￿) more projects, which
each generate surplus VL￿1, are ￿nanced in the low state, which occurs with probability (1 ￿ p).
The marginal cost of having more informed investors is c. If (1 ￿ p)(VL ￿ 1)N0
L (K￿) > c, the
6planner can raise welfare by increasing the number of investors who choose to become informed.2
This can be achieved by either lowering dH below d￿
H or by raising dH above d￿
H, since either
intervention increases total transfers to informed investors.
2.3 Core Intuition
This simpli￿ed outline captures the core intuitions of the full model presented below. There
is an endogenous lack of information production, which is driven by the capital structure de-
cisions of originators. The key is that originators ultimately bear the information production
costs of investors through the transfers ￿S (dS) they pick in each state. In the private market
equilibrium, individual originators seek to minimize these transfers. The planner can raise ex
ante originator welfare because of a pair of market failures: a commitment problem and an
externality. The private market outcome can be ine¢ cient if either market failure is present.
The commitment problem arises because originators choose their transfers after the state
S has been realized, but investors must decide to become informed before the state has been
realized. At t = 0, originators would like to commit themselves to larger transfers if the high
state S = H is realized. They understand that such a commitment would increase the number
of informed investors and thus the probability of receiving ￿nancing if the low state is realized.
But once the high state is realized, originators maximize pro￿ts by minimizing their transfers
to investors, ￿H (dH). Investors anticipate this behavior and decline to become informed at
t = 0. Essentially, there is a market-wide version of the hold-up problem of Hart and Moore
(1988).
The externality in the private market arises even if originators can commit at t = 0 to state-
contingent capital structure choices dH and dL at t = 1. Since each originator is in￿nitesmal,
each takes the aggregate transfer to informed investors as ￿xed. Therefore, each individual
originator has no control over the number of informed investors in the market, K, and cannot
a⁄ect his probability of receiving ￿nancing in the low state, NL (K). However, when aggregated
up, the transfer decisions of individual originators determine the number of informed investors
in the market. Intuitively, there is a tragedy of the commons. Each originator recognizes that
he would bene￿t from the presence of additional informed investors, which could be achieved
by additional high-state transfers ￿H. However, each originator hopes to minimize his share of
these transfers. This tragedy of the commons endogenously leads to an ine¢ ciently low number
of informed investors.
More generally, if individual originators are small but not in￿nitesimal, the externality still
exists. The probability of receiving ￿nancing in the low state would vary with the dH chosen
by an individual originator. However, it varies less from an individual originator￿ s perspective
2This condition embeds the ￿nancing friction necessary to generate ine¢ ciency. To simultaneously have
(1 ￿ p)(VL ￿ 1)N0
L (K￿) > c and c > (1 ￿ p)￿￿L (d￿
L)￿N0
L (K￿), we must have ￿S (d) < VS ￿1 for all d, so that
full surplus of projects cannot be transferred to informed investors. The importance of the ￿nancing friction
will become clearer in the full model where ￿ is determined in equilibrium.
7than it does from the planner￿ s perspective. The intuition is that if an individual originator
could precommit to a di⁄erent dH, the bene￿ts of that decision (higher K and more loan
pools funded in the low state) cannot be promised exclusively to that particular originator:
some bene￿ts will accrue to others so the tragedy of the commons problem still exists. Only
a monopolist originator would not su⁄er from this problem, although a monopolist would still
face the commitment problem discussed above.
What is the assumed form of market incompleteness that gives rise to these two problems?
To solve both problems, we would need to introduce ￿bilateral standby commitments￿at t = 0
that would commit a particular informed investor to provide ￿nancing to a particular originator
if the low state occurs at t = 1 and the originator is rationed. By its very nature, such a
bilateral contract would solve the externality problem￿ if a particular informed investor can
commit capital to particular originator ex ante, then informed capital is no longer a public
good from originators￿perspective.
Critically, this contract would also need to commit the originator to provide the informed
investor with state-contingent transfers at t = 1. The ￿nancing friction￿ i.e., the fact that
the originator cannot pledge the full surplus of the project￿ means that it is insu¢ cient to
guarantee the informed investor high returns in exchange for ￿nancing in only the low state.
The contract must also guarantee the informed investor some positive transfer in the high state.
Such contracts, similar in some respects to bank loan commitments, are typically outside the
scope of the anonymous, arm￿ s length securities markets, and were not a prominent feature
of the market for securitizations in the mid-2000s. As intermediation moves outside of the
traditional banking sector, which often relies on these kinds of billateral contracts, and into
markets, it becomes subject to the problems we highlight in this paper.
Interventions by a planner can solve both of these problems by pre-committing originators
to a given transfer policy ex ante and by forcing all originators to participate. The planner
e⁄ectively acts as a monopolistic originator with a commitment device.
2.4 Relation to Full Model
This simpli￿ed outline illustrates the core intuitions of the paper. The full model provides
speci￿c microfoundations to ￿ esh out the skeleton presented here, focusing particularly on two
points. First, we provide a microfoundation for the idea that originators control their transfers
to informed investors through their security design decisions. This result is well-established
in the literature. Speci￿cally, Myers and Majluf (1984), Boot and Thakor (1993), Du¢ e and
DeMarzo (1999), and many others argue that minimizing adverse selection is a key purpose of
security design.
Second, the full model demonstrates how the limited capital of informed investors may
constrain the ￿nancing of positive NPV projects. This is related to the literature on credit
rationing (Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)), which shows that information asymmetries can result in
8positive NPV projects going unfunded. Speci￿cally, in the bad state of our model, it is not
possible to raise su¢ cient ￿nancing from uninformed investors due to the threat of adverse
selection. Informed investors are not subject to adverse selection concerns and, hence, are
a robust source of capital that alleviates underfunding in bad times. Our main contribution
is to show that private optimizing originators will design their securities in a manner that
blunts investor incentives to become informed. The resulting endogenous shortage of informed
investors leads to ine¢ cient rationing in bad times.
3 Model
In this section, we present the full model. Section 3.1. describes the setup of the full model and
discusses our key modeling assumption that information production infrastructure is ￿xed in the
short run. In Section 3.2, we solve for the private market equilibrium. Section 3.3 derives the
planner￿ s solution, which involves increasing the amount of informationally sensitive securities
issued in good times, and explains the forces that generate the ine¢ ciency of the private market
outcome. Section 3.4 considers optimal interventions when the planner can both limit the
issuance of safe securities in good times and guarantee debt in bad times.
3.1 Setup
The full model has 4 periods (t = 0;1;2;3) and three types of risk-neutral agents: originators,
investors, and market makers. As in the simpli￿ed model, there is a continuum of measure 1 of
originators. Each is endowed with the opportunity to originate a pool of loans at time 1, but
has no capital. Loan pools are indivisible, and originating a loan pool requires $1 of ￿nancing.
To raise this ￿nancing, originators tranche the cash ￿ ows from their pools into senior debt
claims and junior equity claims. They then attempt to raise $1 by selling some or all of these
claims to investors, retaining the rights to any residual cash ￿ ows.
Loan pool payo⁄s are realized at time 3. Payo⁄s depend on the state of the macroeconomy,
which is common across all pools, and the quality or type of the individual pool, which is
idiosyncratic. At t = 1, when loan pools are originated, the state of the macroeconomy is
common knowledge to originators and all investors, but the types of individual loan pools are
unknown. Asymmetric information about individual loan pools is the key driving force in the
model.
As before, the state of the macroeconomy is S 2 fH;Lg (high or low), and the probability
that the high state occurs at t = 1 is Pr[S = H] = p. Individual pools are either of good or bad
quality, denoted by Q 2 fG;Bg, and the fraction of good pools is Pr[Q = G] = ￿ in both states.
Good pools pay vG > 1 regardless of the state. By contrast, bad pools pay vB
H < 1 in the high
state and vB
L < vB
H in the low state. We think of the payo⁄ on bad pools in the high state, vB
H,
as being relatively close to 1. The idea is that loan pools are very safe in good times because
9the idiosyncratic default risk of individual loans is diversi￿ed away and systematic default risk
is minimal in the high state.3
The only di⁄erence between the high state and the low state is that bad pools have worse
payo⁄s in the low state. This increases the scope for adverse selection in the low state. Let
VS = ￿vG+(1 ￿ ￿)vB
S denote the expected value of the average loan pool in state S. We assume
that VH > VL > 1 so that funding loan pools is positive NPV even in the low state. Note
that this assumption means that, in contrast to much of the existing literature, information
production does not a⁄ect the quality of the projects undertaken. Since funding loan pools
is positive NPV in both states of the world, zero information production would be the best
outcome, a point emphasized by Dang, Gorton, and Holmstrom (2010). However, as we show
below, information production has indirect social value in the model: the presence of informed
capital increases the quantity of projects that can be ￿nanced in bad times which raises total
originator surplus. Essentially, informed capital helps to solve a credit rationing problem in bad
times. This setup enables us to emphasize the indirect ￿market robustness￿value of informed
capital.
There is an in￿nite mass of investors. Each investor is initially identical and endowed with
$1 of capital. All investors have access to a riskless storage technology in each period that
generates a net return of zero. At t = 0, before the state S is known, each investor may make
an irreversible decision to become informed by paying cost c to build information production
infrastructure. In return for paying this cost, informed investors will learn the type of individual
loan pools at t = 2. That is, informed investors will be able to distinguish good loan pools that
pay vG from bad loan pools that pay vB
S at t = 2. The number of informed investors is a proxy
for the total information production infrastructure in the market. The key assumption is that
investors make an infrastructure decision at t = 0 and that these choices cannot be conditioned
on the realization of the state of the macroeconomy S at t = 1. This captures the idea that
capital and information infrastructure are ￿xed in the short run.
The assumption that the amount of informed capital is ￿xed at t = 1 also a⁄ects the returns
informed investors are able to earn. When originators sell claims backed by their loan pools at
t = 1, they face a ￿xed number of informed investors. Therefore, as discussed further below,
the relative scarcity of informed investors is a key determinant of the pro￿ts the informed earn
in the primary market for equity.
At t = 2, after loan pools have been originated and sold to investors, informed investors learn
the quality of individual pools. This information is private, and uninformed investors do not
learn the quality of individual pools until t = 3. After individual loan pool types are revealed to
the informed, fraction ‘ of both informed and uninformed investors are hit by liquidity shocks.
These liquidity shocks force investors to trade, raising the possibility of adverse selection at
t = 2, which in turn impacts the prices that investors are willing to pay at t = 1.
3This point is developed further in the Internet Appendix where we explain why our model is speci￿cally
geared towards securitization and not the capital structure choices of individual ￿rms.
10Figure 1: Structure of the Game.
Investors hit by liquidity shocks must sell their securities. In addition, informed investors
may, in the aggregate, sell short M units of debt per loan pool originated. Uninformed investors
have no private information and therefore will not sell securities short in equilibrium. Short
selling of debt by informed investors in the secondary market opens the door for adverse selection
at t = 2. Investors sell their securities to the third group of agents in the model, uninformed
market makers. We assume these market makers have enough capital to buy all securities
investors wish to sell at t = 2. Prices in the secondary market will be pinned down by market
makers￿zero-pro￿t condition.
Figure 1 summarizes the timing of the game. At t = 0 investors choose whether or not to
become informed. At t = 1 the state of the macroeconomy is revealed to everyone. Originators
then attempt to originate loan pools and sell claims backed by those cash ￿ ows to investors. At
t = 2, the quality of individual loan pools is revealed to informed investors. Some investors are
then hit by liquidity shocks and sell securities to market makers. At t = 3, payo⁄s are realized.
3.1.1 What is Information Production Infrastructure?
Information production infrastructure in the model can be thought of as market-speci￿c infor-
mation technology or human capital. As pointed out by Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2009) and
Arora et al. (2009), analysis of securitizations is computationally complex. For an investment
fund to produce information about speci￿c securitizations, it must have a variety of databases
11and analytical tools, as well as a stock of human capital (i.e., analysts) familiar with these tools.
The assumption that the amount of informed capital is ￿xed in the short run is critical to
our results and captures two natural ideas. First, ￿nancial capital is slow-moving following
market shocks due to a variety of frictions (Du¢ e 2010). Speci￿cally, it takes time to reallocate
￿nancial capital from delegated investors lacking information infrastructure to those with the
necessary infrastructure. Informed investors may need several months to raise new funds, a
signi￿cant amount of time for primary markets to be constrained.
Second, it takes time to build information infrastructure. Once an investment fund decides
to build additional analytical capacity, it could take several months for that capacity to come
online. Indeed, the American Securitization Forum (2008) recognized that this time-to-build
problem was exacerbating the shutdown of the securitization market in late 2008, reporting that
￿The market faces signi￿cant challenges in developing new investors... Sources of new funds
that could potentially be invested ... will need to ￿nd mechanisms to access the capabilities
and infrastructure necessary to manage securitized products.￿In summary, the combination of
slow-moving capital and a time-to-build problem for informational infrastructure means that
the amount of informed capital may often be ￿xed in the short-run.
3.2 Private Market Equilibrium
We now construct the private market equilibrium. We start by considering the outcome of the
secondary market trading game at t = 2. We then fold this back into the prices that investors
are willing to pay for securities at t = 1. Taking these prices as given, we then consider the
t = 1 capital structure decisions of originators (i.e., the mix of debt and equity they use to
￿nance loan pools). Finally, we consider the t = 0 decisions of investors to become informed.
3.2.1 Adverse Selection in the Time 2 Secondary Trading Game
We begin with the trading game at t = 2. The trading game raises the prospect of adverse
selection by forcing uninformed investors to face informed investors in the secondary market.
Suppose we are in state S at t = 2 and that originators have chosen to issue debt of face value
dS at t = 1. Furthermore, suppose that at the chosen value of dS informed investors choose
to buy equity claims and uninformed investors choose to buy debt claims. In Appendix B we
verify that this is indeed the case in equilibrium when M is su¢ ciently large.
Recall that there is asymmetric information at t = 2. Speci￿cally, informed investors can
distinguish good and bad loan pools, but uninformed investors and market makers cannot.
There are two separate secondary markets, one where all debt securities are traded and one
where all equity securities are traded. Prices in both markets are set by uninformed market
makers to make zero pro￿ts on average. First consider the secondary market for debt. Fraction
‘ of uninformed investors will be hit by liquidity shocks and will be forced to sell their debt,
12which will be of average quality. In addition, all informed investors will short sell debt backed
by bad pools, generating adverse selection in the market.4
We assume that informed investors can, in the aggregate, sell short M units of debt per loan
pool originated. A large M indicates fewer impediments to short-selling. The market maker
will set the t = 2 price of debt, P2 [D;dS], so that his pro￿ts from forced sellers exactly o⁄set
his losses to informed short sellers
‘
￿
￿min
￿
v
G;dS
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿)min
￿
v
B
S ;dS
￿
￿ P2 [dS;D]
￿
| {z }
Pro￿t from forced sales by the uninformed
= M
￿
P2 [dS;D] ￿ min
￿
v
B
S ;dS
￿￿
| {z }
Loss to informed
:
This implies that
P2 [D;dS] = ￿min
￿
v
G;dS
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿)min
￿
v
B
S ;dS
￿
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Expected value
￿ ￿
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￿
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￿
v
G;dS
￿
￿ min
￿
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B
S ;dS
￿￿
| {z }
Adverse selection discount
,
so risky debt (dS > vB
S ) trades at a discount to its expected value in the secondary market.
Next consider the secondary market for equity. Informed investors who are hit by liquidity
shocks are forced to sell their equity, regardless of the quality of the pool backing it. In addition,
informed investors not hit by liquidity shocks will opportunistically sell their bad pools. For
simplicity, we assume that informed investors are not able to borrow any additional equity to
sell short, since all of the equity in bad pools is already being sold at t = 2. This assumption
is not critical but simpli￿es the analysis considerably. In the Internet Appendix, we show that
our results continue to hold when we treat debt and equity symmetrically.5
The market maker sets the t = 2 price of equity, P2 [E;dS], such that
Pro￿t from forced sales z }| {
‘
￿
￿max
￿
v
G ￿ dS;0
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿)max
￿
v
B
S ￿ dS;0
￿
￿ P2 [dS;E]
￿
= (1 ￿ ‘)(1 ￿ ￿)
￿
P2 [dS;E] ￿ max
￿
v
B
S ￿ dS;0
￿￿
| {z }
Loss from opportunistic sales
,
4We make the standard assumption that market makers cannot identify investors as informed or uninformed
and therefore cannot discriminate between forced sales and informed short sales.
5Speci￿cally, in the Internet Appendix, we assume that short-selling is not allowed for either debt or equity.
Instead, adverse selection on risky debt stems from the fact that informed investors choose to purchase some
fraction of debt in the primary market at t = 1. Because informed investors opportunistically sell risky debt
backed by bad loan pools at t = 2, debt trades at a discount at t = 2. And because the uninformed are the
marginal debt investors at t = 1, this adverse selection discount is re￿ ected in time 1 prices. In equilibrium,
informed investors adjust their primary market purchases of debt and equity so that the scarcity returns on
equity equal the adverse selection trading pro￿ts on risky debt.
In the main text, allowing the informed to short risky debt backed by bad pools is a simple modeling device
that enables us to transparently capture the informational rent that informed investors extract. Speci￿cally, by
assuming that the informed can always short M pools, we bypass the complexities of their optimal portfolio
allocation problem. However, our results continue to hold when we do not make this simplifying assumption.
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P2 [dS;E] =
Expected value
z }| {
￿max
￿
v
G ￿ dS;0
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿)max
￿
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B
S ￿ dS;0
￿
￿￿
(1 ￿ ‘)(1 ￿ ￿)
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G ￿ dS;0
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￿
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S ￿ dS;0
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| {z }
Adverse selection discount
.
Thus, both debt and equity trade at an adverse selection discount at t = 2 due to opportunistic
trading by informed investors.
3.2.2 Security Prices and Capital Structure Decisions at Time 1
Next consider the prices that informed and uninformed investors are willing to pay for securities
at t = 1. Recall that at t = 1, the state of the macroeconomy is common knowledge, but the
quality of individual loan pools are unknown to all agents. The uninformed anticipate that
with probability ‘ they will be forced to sell at an unfavorable price at t = 2. Therefore, they
will charge an adverse selection discount at t = 1, and the price of debt at t = 1 is
P [D;dS] =
Expected value
z }| {
￿min
￿
v
G;dS
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿)min
￿
v
B
S ;dS
￿
￿
Expected loss from adverse selection when forced to sell
z }| {
￿‘
M
M + ‘
￿
min
￿
v
G;dS
￿
￿ min
￿
v
B
S ;dS
￿￿
(1)
The adverse selection discount simply compensates the uninformed for the expected wealth
transfer to the informed in the secondary market at t = 2.
While informed investors also su⁄er from adverse selection when hit by liquidity shocks,
they bene￿t from their ability to adversely select others when they are not hit by liquidity
shocks. The expected payo⁄ to purchasing equity for informed investors is
Good pool, no liquidity shock
z }| {
￿(1 ￿ ‘)max
￿
v
G ￿ dS;0
￿
+
Good pool, forced sale
z }| {
￿‘P2 [dS;E] +
Bad pool
z }| {
(1 ￿ ￿)P2 [dS;E]
= ￿max
￿
v
G ￿ dS;0
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿)max
￿
v
B
S ￿ dS;0
￿
:
Since market makers make zero pro￿ts, adverse selection between informed investors simply
transfers wealth between them and nets out in the aggregate. Thus, the expected payo⁄ to
purchasing equity for the informed is the fundamental value of the equity, and the informed do
not need to charge an adverse selection discount at t = 1.
However, recall there are a ￿xed number of informed investors at t = 1. Therefore, the
number of investors who become informed may be small enough that they can earn a positive
rent based on their scarcity.6 Let the return earned per dollar invested by the informed in
6By contrast, there are an in￿nite number of uninformed investors in the primary market for debt and an
in￿nite number of uninformed market makers in secondary markets. As a result, they are never scarce and
14state S be rS. rS is taken as ￿xed by originators, but in equilibrium it will be determined by
the relative scarcity of informed capital as described in detail below. Thus, the price informed
investors are willing to pay for equity claims at t = 1 is given by
P [dS;E] =
￿max
￿
vG ￿ dS;0
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿)max
￿
vB
S ￿ dS;0
￿
1 + rS
: (2)
Thus, two opposing violations of the Modigliani-Miller (1958) theorem pin down an optimal
capital structure. Debt su⁄ers from an adverse selection discount, while originators perceive
equity as expensive due to the scarcity return earned by informed investors. Note that both
violations result in transfers from originators to informed investors, as assumed in the simpli￿ed
model.
Originators pick the face value of debt dS to maximize the value of the stake they retain in
the loan pool ￿ or equivalently to minimize their transfer to the informed.7 Appendix B shows
that originators￿objective function can be written as
max
dS
P [dS;E] + P [dS;D]:
Figure 2 depicts this capital structure decision, plotting security prices as a function of dS. The
dotted blue line shows that the price of debt increases one-for-one with dS when dS < vB
S because
debt is risk-free in this range. When dS > vB
S , the debt is risky and its price increases at rate
￿(1 ￿ ‘M (M + ‘)
￿1), where ￿ re￿ ects the debt￿ s riskiness and (1 ￿ ‘M (M + ‘)
￿1) re￿ ects the
adverse selection discount charged by uninformed investors. The solid green line shows that
the price of equity decreases with dS, ￿rst at rate ￿1=(1 + rS) for dS < vB
S and then at rate
￿￿=(1 + rS) for dS > vB
S .
Since 1 > 1=(1 + rS), the value of equity decreases more slowly than the value of debt
increases when the debt is risk-free (dS < vB
S ). Thus, originators always want to issue as much
risk-free debt as possible to economize on costly informed capital. Would originators want to
set dS > vB
S and sell risky debt to uninformed investors? If
‘
M
M + ‘
> 1 ￿
1
1 + rS
; (3)
the adverse selection discount charged by the uninformed for risky debt outweighs the higher
rate of return charged by the informed. This condition holds when ‘ and M are su¢ ciently
large or rS is su¢ ciently small. When it holds, originators ￿nd it optimal to only issue risk-free
debt, setting d￿
S = vB
S . Note that d￿
L = vB
L < vB
H = d￿
H, so the originators￿optimal capital
structure involves more equity in the low state, when the scope for uninformed debt investors
always earn 0 return.
7The assumption that originators choose capital structures consisting only of debt and equity is without loss
of generality. We would get the exact same results if originators issued debt to uninformed investors and some
combination of risky junior debt and risky equity to informed investors.
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Figure 2: Originator Capital Structure Decisions.
to be adversely selected is higher.
The optimality of risk-free debt, which holds when (3) is satis￿ed, is a result of our assump-
tion that loan pool payo⁄s are binary (either vG or vB
S ). In the Internet Appendix we develop
a more general version of the model where pool payo⁄s are continuously distributed and show
that originators ￿nd it optimal to issue debt that is slightly risky.
3.2.3 Investor Decisions to Become Informed at Time 0
Next we ￿nd the number of investors, K, who choose to become informed at time 0. To do so,
we ￿rst discuss how the return rS earned by informed investors in state S is determined. The
amount of equity ￿nancing originators attempt to raise from informed investors in state S is
eS = 1 ￿ P [dS;D]. We will say that informed capital is ￿maximally scarce￿when it is fully
invested in equity so that K ￿ eS.
As in any model with capital constraints, the fact that the amount of informed capital, K, is
￿xed at t = 1 means that the relative scarcity of informed investors determines the returns they
are able to earn. When informed investors are relatively abundant, originators can e⁄ectively
hold them up, capturing most of the value of loan pools. Conversely, when informed investors
are relatively scarce, they can capture more value from originators.
Formally, we write the return earned by the informed as a function of the supply and
demand for informed capital: rS = r[K;eS]. In a ￿Walrasian￿model of the interaction between
originators and informed investors, r[￿] takes a simple form. When informed investors are
maximally scarce (K ￿ eS), they capture as much of the value of loan pools as possible. When
they are not maximally scarce (K > eS), they earn zero return.
To keep everything di⁄erentiable, we will not use the Walrasian model in the main text.
16Instead, we will assume that r[￿] is smooth so that informed investors earn a positive return
even when they are less than maximally scarce. As we show in Appendix A, this assumption
can be micro-founded using a variant of the Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985) bargaining model,
in which originators must search for informed investors with whom they transact.8
The function r[￿] determines the return earned by informed capital invested in equity. The
following properties of the r[￿] function will be used in the proofs:
1. Returns exceed c when it is maximally scarce: r[K;eS] > c when K ￿ eS.
2. Informed capital earns a higher return when it is more scarce: @r=@K < 0 and @ (r[K;eS] ￿ eS)=@eS >
0 (i.e., total informed pro￿t per pool, r[K;eS] ￿ eS, is increasing in the amount of equity
originators attempt to raise).
3. Financing Friction: The full surplus associated with loan pools cannot be pledged to
informed investors even when they are maximally scarce. Speci￿cally, rS ￿ eS < (VS ￿ 1)
where VS = ￿vG + (1 ￿ ￿)vB
S is the value of the average loan pool in state S.
The ￿rst property is an assumption. The second and third properties are microfounded in
Appendix A. The ￿rst property states that it is possible for an informed investor to recoup her
up-front infrastructure cost. The second property states that informed investors can extract
more surplus from originators when informed capital is more scarce. This implies that the
returns earned by informed investors are decreasing in the face value of debt.9
The third property is the key ￿nancing friction in the model. It drives a wedge between the
private and social returns to informed capital, raising the possibility that the private market
outcome may be ine¢ cient. As shown in Appendix A, this property emerges naturally from
the bargaining power of originators. Alternatively, it can be simply taken as an assumption
motivated by moral hazard considerations outside the model. For instance, the originator may
have to retain a stake in the loan pool to provide incentives for monitoring borrowers.
When informed capital is maximally scarce (K ￿ eS), the number of pools that can be
funded becomes constrained by the amount of informed capital available. Speci￿cally, if capital
is maximally scarce in state S the number of projects that are funded is NS = K=eS ￿ 1. This
rationing outcome follows from the decentralized and sequential market structure inherent in
any search model. The originators who encounter informed investors early transact, while those
who do not are shut out of the market.
We can now analyze investor decisions to become informed at t = 0. Informed investors
must earn an average return of c to break even. Thus, the equilibrium number of investors who
8This is e⁄ectively an extension of Nash bargaining to settings with continuums of agents. See Du¢ e,
Garleanu, and Pedersen (2005, 2007) for further applications of bargaining models in ￿nancial markets. The
assumption that r[￿] is smooth is solely for expositional simplicity. In Appendix A we also show that one obtains
identical results if the Walrasian model is used.
9To see this note that @ (r[K;eS] ￿ eS)=@dS = ￿(@ (r[K;eS] ￿ eS)=@eS)(@P [dS;D]=@dS) < 0:
17choose to become informed, K￿, satis￿es the same zero pro￿t condition as in the reduced-form
model
cK
￿ = p ￿ NH ￿ ￿H [K
￿;d
￿
H] + (1 ￿ p) ￿ NL ￿ ￿L [K
￿;d
￿
L] (4)
where NS = minf1;K￿=e￿
Sg is the number of loan pools originated in state S and
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￿;d
￿
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￿
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￿
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secondary debt market adverse selection pro￿ts
(5)
is the pro￿t earned by informed investors in state S per pool originated. Informed investors
can (in expectation) earn pro￿ts from two sources: their scarcity in the primary market for
equity at time 1 and their trading in the secondary market for debt at time 2. Recall that, in
expectation, informed investors earn no adverse selection pro￿ts from trading in the secondary
market for equity: sometimes they are hit by liquidity shocks and su⁄er losses due to adverse
selection, while other times they are not hit by liquidity shocks and pro￿t from their ability to
opportunistically sell equity in bad pools.
We now ￿nd conditions under which e￿
H < K￿ < e￿
L (where e￿
S = 1 ￿ P [d￿
S;D]), so that
there is enough informed capital to fund all loan pools in the high state but not enough to fund
all loan pools in the low state. First, note that we must have K￿ > e￿
H. Suppose the number
of informed investors is K ￿ e￿
H. Since e￿
H < e￿
L, informed investors would be maximally scarce
in both states, and they would earn a return greater than c in both states of the world by the
￿rst property of r[￿]. Thus, informed investors would earn positive pro￿ts and (4) would not
be satis￿ed. More investors would choose to become informed so K￿ > e￿
H.
Next suppose there are just enough informed investors to fund all loan pools in the low state
(K = e￿
L = 1 ￿ P [d￿
L;D]). If
p ￿ ￿H [1 ￿ P [d
￿
L;D];d
￿
H] + (1 ￿ p) ￿ ￿L [1 ￿ P [d
￿
L;D];d
￿
L] < c(1 ￿ P [d
￿
L;D]), (6)
these informed investors do not earn enough to break even. Thus, assuming condition (6), we
will have e￿
H < K￿ < e￿
L.
These conditions simplify when condition (3) is satis￿ed, and originators choose to make the
debt risk-free. Then d￿
S = vB
S and e￿
S = 1￿vS
B, so there is no adverse selection in the secondary
market for debt and the informed must fully recoup the costs of infrastructure by charging a
scarcity premium in the primary market for equity. Condition (6) then reduces to
p ￿ r
￿
1 ￿ v
B
L;v
B
H
￿ 1 ￿ vB
H
1 ￿ vB
L
+ (1 ￿ p) ￿ r
￿
1 ￿ v
B
L;v
B
L
￿
< c,
and the zero pro￿t condition for informed investors is given by
cK
￿ = p ￿ r
￿
K
￿;1 ￿ v
B
H
￿
￿
￿
1 ￿ v
B
H
￿
+ (1 ￿ p) ￿ r
￿
K
￿;1 ￿ v
B
L
￿
￿ K
￿:
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￿v
G + (1 ￿ ￿)v
B
L ￿ ￿‘M (M + ‘)
￿1 ￿
v
G ￿ v
B
L
￿
< 1; (7)
so originators who are unable to raise equity capital from informed investors cannot raise $1
of ￿nancing using only debt capital from uninformed investors in the low state. That is, even
if we set dS = vG so that the debt is a claim on the entire value of the loan pool, uninformed
investors will not provide $1 of ￿nancing. Since vB
L < 1, this condition always holds if ‘ and/or
M are su¢ ciently large. Essentially, we are assuming that adverse selection problems are severe
enough in bad times that uninformed investors are unwilling to provide enough ￿nancing to
originate a loan pool without the participation of informed investors. The idea that concerns
about adverse selection may prevent agents from undertaking positive NPV projects is well
established in the literature on asymmetric information (see e.g., Stiglitz and Weiss (1981),
Besanko and Thakor (1987), and Bernhardt (2000)). And, critically, equation (7) means that
the amount of informed capital can be a binding constraint on loan pool origination in bad
times.
The private market equilibrium of interest is summarized by the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Suppose that conditions (3), (6), and (7) are satis￿ed. Then the private market
equilibrium is a triple (K￿;d￿
H;d￿
L) such that: (i) originator capital structure decisions are
optimal and d￿
S = vB
S ; (ii) the number of informed investors K￿ satis￿es the zero-pro￿t condition
(4); and (iii) the number of loan pools originated is N￿
H = 1 in the high state and N￿
L =
K￿=(1 ￿ d￿
L) < 1 so that positive NPV loan pools go unfunded in the low state.
Proof. All proofs are presented in Appendix B.
Note that the severity of adverse selection, which is controlled by M and ‘ in the model,
is critical to equilibrium we construct. If M is small enough that condition (3) does not hold,
then originators always ￿nd it optimal to issue only risky debt to ￿nance their loan pools (i.e.
they will set dS > vB
S such that P [d￿
S;D] = 1). They will be able to raise the full $1 necessary
to ￿nance their loan pools in this manner because condition (7) will not hold when M is small.
Thus, adverse selection will never be bad enough to cause the collapse of the market. When (6)
is not satis￿ed, enough investors become fully informed to fund all loan pools in the low state.
3.2.4 Private Market Instability
The private market equilibrium in the full model features a crash in issuance in the low state.
Despite the fact that the average loan pool is positive NPV in the low state, it cannot be ￿nanced
because uninformed investors are unwilling to provide funding. In equilibrium, originators sell
as much risk-free debt as possible in both states of the world. They do this because tranching
cash ￿ ows is valuable: it allows originators to economize on costly informed capital. However,
originators economize so much that they blunt incentives to become informed at time 0. The
19amount of robust informed capital may be insu¢ cient to ￿nance all loan pools in bad times,
and positive NPV loan pools go unfunded.
Informed capital is robust because even though informed investors who purchase equity
sometimes su⁄er adverse selection when they are hit by liquidity shocks, they also pro￿t from
adverse selection when they are not hit by liquidity shocks. As a result, their willingness to
participate in the primary issuance market does not decline when the scope for adverse selection
declines in bad times.10
The nature of the private market equilibrium depends crucially on the fact that investor
infrastructure decisions cannot be made state-contingent. To see this, suppose there were only
a single state of the world. Then investors would be able to perfectly forecast demand for
informed capital and enough investors would become informed to fund all loan pools.
Why ignorance may not be bliss One might wonder whether an ￿ignorance-is-bliss￿(i.e.,
K = 0) outcome, in the words of Dang, Gorton, and Holmstrom (2010), is possible in our
setting. Since there is no direct social bene￿t of information production in our setting, a
planner in our model would ideally want to prohibit all investors from building information
infrastructure. However, in a more complicated model where informed investors also provide
direct social bene￿ts by improving the real investment decisions of ￿rms (e.g., by screening out
negative NPV projects) such a prohibition would be undesirable.
Furthermore, it would be di¢ cult if not impossible to enforce such a prohibition. And if
the planner cannot prevent investors from becoming informed, a K = 0 equilibrium is not
sustainable in our model. The key assumption that drives this result is that positive NPV
loans pools require risky external ￿nance (i.e., vB
S < 1). To see this, conjecture an equilibrium
in which K = 0 and all investors are uninformed. Since originators must raise $1 of external
￿nance, at least 1 ￿ vB
S of it must be risky regardless of the form of the ￿nancing. As a result,
adverse selection pro￿ts equal to ‘M (M + ‘)
￿1 ￿
1 ￿ vB
S
￿
are available in state S. Mass K of
investors could become informed and earn a return on capital of
K
￿1 M‘
M + ‘
￿
p
￿
1 ￿ v
B
H
￿
+ (1 ￿ p)
￿
1 ￿ v
B
L
￿￿
;
which can be made larger than c by taking K small enough. Thus, some mass K > 0 of investors
will always choose to become informed. Once some investors become informed, market crashes
due to adverse selection can occur because information infrastructure cannot be made state
contingent.11
10Indeed the fact that equity trades in our model is not critical to our results. We make this assumption for
symmetry so that equity is subject to the same type of adverse selection problems that the debt is, which helps
underscore our point that informed capital is robust capital.
11In contrast, in Dang, Gorton, and Holmstrom (2010) information production decisions can be made at any
time. However, in their model symmetric ignorance dominates symmetric information. Trade is constrained
by the cash-on-hand of patient agents when there is good news about asset values. Thus, it is better to trade
20The key point of our paper is then this: in a world where an ignorance-is-bliss equilibrium
cannot be sustained, it may be optimal to encourage, rather than discourage, the entry of
informed investors because these investors are a robust source of capital. As the next section
shows, this objective can be achieved through capital structure regulation in good times.
3.3 The Planner￿ s Problem: Regulating Capital Structure
We next turn to the social planner￿ s problem. Our welfare criterion is total ex ante originator
surplus, so we can either think of the planner simply as a coordinator trying to maximize the
surplus of originators as a group. As in the simpli￿ed model, ex ante originator surplus is given
by
pNH (VH ￿ 1) + (1 ￿ p)NL (VL ￿ 1) ￿ cK
where VS = ￿vG+(1 ￿ ￿)vB
S is the expected value of loan pools in state S and where NS in the
number of loan pools originated in state S. As we discuss in Appendix B, since all investors
earn zero pro￿ts, this quantity is also equivalent to combined ex ante surplus of originators and
investors.
Could a social planner increase surplus by imposing ex ante restrictions on originator capital
structure decisions in good times? We let the planner pick dH and let K￿ = K￿ [dH] be implicitly
de￿ned by the zero-pro￿t condition of the informed (4). At the private market equilibrium we
have dH = vB
H, NH = 1, and NL = K￿ [dH]=
￿
1 ￿ vB
L
￿
. Di⁄erentiating total surplus with respect
to dH shows that the e⁄ect of altering dH consists of two parts:
￿
(1 ￿ p)
￿
VL ￿ 1
1 ￿ vB
L
￿
￿ c
￿
| {z }
@K￿
@dH
:
The ￿rst part is the social return to informed capital net of its cost. An extra unit of informed
capital has cost c. The bene￿t of having this extra unit of informed capital is that it is a
robust source of funding in the low state. The low state occurs with probability (1 ￿ p); and
an additional unit of capital can ￿nance 1=
￿
1 ￿ vL
B
￿
more loan pools, each of which generates
VL ￿ 1 of surplus. When
(1 ￿ p)
￿
VL ￿ 1
1 ￿ vB
L
￿
> c (8)
the social bene￿t of informed capital exceeds its cost. In this case, the planner would like
to encourage more investors to become informed by creating more informationally sensitive
securities, either lowering dH if @K￿=@dH < 0 or raising it if @K￿=@dH > 0. By contrast, if
without information production at the expected value of the asset than it is to trade with information production
when the wealth constraint can become binding and limit trade. As a result, debt that induces zero information
production is optimal in their model, not just because it eliminates adverse selection, but also because it reduces
the variance of security prices.
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Figure 3: Model Behavior Varying the Frequency of the High State p and the NPV of the
Average Loan Pool ￿.
condition (8) does not hold, the planner would not want to pursue such interventions.12
Figure 3 illustrates the parameter values for which the planner would like to intervene to
encourage more investors to become informed. It shows the e⁄ects of varying ￿, which controls
the NPV of the average loan pool, and p, the frequency of the high state, while holding ￿xed
all other parameters (vG, vB
L, c, and w). The dashed red line corresponds to condition (6),
while the solid blue line corresponds to condition (8). In Regions 1 and 2 the social bene￿t
of additional informed capital does not outweigh its cost. In Region 1 many loan pools are
bad (￿ is low), and in Region 2 the low state is infrequent (p is high). In Region 4 there is no
underfunding in the private market equilibrium because enough investors become informed to
fund all loan pools in the low state. In Region 3 there is socially ine¢ cient underfunding in
the private market equilibrium. In this region, the planner would regulate originator capital
structure decisions in the high state.
How would the ￿gure change if we modi￿ed the other parameters? Changes that increase
the social bene￿t of loan pools (i.e., increasing vG or vB
L) or decrease the cost of becoming
informed c shift the regional borders up and to the left. There would be fewer parameter values
where underfunding is e¢ cient and more parameter values where there is no underfunding.
Increasing the size of the ￿nancing friction increases the area of Region 3, where underfunding
is ine¢ cient. Conversely, when there is no ￿nancing friction, Region 3 vanishes.
12Indeed, the planner may want to discourage investors from becoming informed. However, the planner￿ s
ability to restrict informed capital may be limited. As we argue below, lowering dH (relative to the private
market equilibrium) always increases the amount of informed capital, while raising dH may either increase or
decrease it. Thus, if (8) does not hold, the planner either wants to raise dH if that would lower the amount of
informed capital, or she simply accepts the private market outcome as the constrained e¢ cient outcome.
223.3.1 Planner￿ s Interventions
Since there are constant returns to loan pool origination, when condition (8) is met, the planner
wants ensure that all loan pools are funded in the low state. How can she accomplish this? Two
types of ex ante capital structure regulation could increase the number of informed investors.
First, at time 0 the planner could announce a limit on the issuance of risk-free debt in the high
state at time 1. Second, at time 0 the planner could announce that the face value of debt in
the high state at time 1 must be higher than in the private market equilibrium, increasing the
riskiness of the debt. Both interventions e⁄ectively allow the planner to subsidize information
production by increasing the amount of informationally sensitive securities from which informed
investors can pro￿t in good times.
First consider interventions that limit the issuance of risk-free debt in the high state (i.e.,
lower dH). Intuitively, when dH < d￿
H = vB
H the debt is risk-free so the informed earn no adverse
selection pro￿ts in the secondary market; their only source of pro￿ts is primary market scarcity.
Reducing the amount of risk-free debt issued increases the demand for informed capital in the
primary market for equity. This increases the scarcity pro￿ts earned by the informed in the
primary market and thus encourages more investors to become informed ex ante.
The planner can always use such interventions to ensure that all loan pools are funded in
the low state. Speci￿cally, the planner can limit high-state debt issuance to a value d￿￿
H such
that d￿
L < d￿￿
H < d￿
H so enough investors become informed to fund all loan pools in the low state.
Note that while the planner increases the number of informed investors, it is ine¢ cient for all
investors to be informed. She does not set d￿￿
H = 0 because securitization has social value in
the model, reducing the number of investors who pay the infrastructure cost c. However, from
the planner￿ s perspective, the private market skimps too much on these costs.
Next consider interventions that increase the riskiness of debt in the high state by raising its
face value (i.e., raising dH). For dH > d￿
H = vB
H, the e⁄ect on the number of informed investors
is ambiguous. Intuitively, once the planner perturbs dH so that the debt is slightly risky, the
informed have two possible sources of pro￿ts: scarcity in the primary market for equity and
adverse selection in the secondary market for debt. Raising dH lowers the demand for informed
capital in the primary market for equity, reducing the scarcity pro￿ts. However, raising dH
also increases the riskiness of the debt, increasing the adverse selection pro￿ts the informed can
earn. The nature of primary market scarcity returns r[￿] determines which e⁄ect dominates.
In particular, if @rH=@dH is not too negative, so that informed investors do not lose a large
amount of primary equity market pro￿ts, raising the face value of debt increases the number
of informed investors.
The planner￿ s solutions are characterized in the following propositions.
Proposition 2 Suppose that conditions (3), (6), (7), and (8) are satis￿ed. Then the planner
can increase total surplus by limiting debt issuance in the high state. This solution is given by
the triple (K￿￿;d￿￿
H;d￿￿
L ) such that: (i) d￿￿
L = d￿
L = vB
L and the planner limits debt in the high
23state: d￿￿
H < d￿
H; (ii) the number of informed investors is greater than in the private market
outcome: K￿￿ = K [d￿￿
H] = 1￿d￿￿
L > K￿; and (iii) the number of projects undertaken is N￿￿
H = 1
in the high state and N￿￿
L = 1 so that there is no underfunding in the low state.
Proposition 3 Suppose that conditions (3), (6), (7), and (8) are satis￿ed. The planner may
also be able to increase total surplus by requiring the debt issued in the high state to be riskier.
In particular, if @rH=@dH is not too negative, the planner can increase the number of informed
investors by raising the high-state face value of debt dH.
Policies limiting the issuance of safe securities raise the returns to informed investors and
reduce originator pro￿ts in the high state, and thus represent an ￿in-kind￿subsidy to informed
investors. This subsidy can be achieved by either limiting the issuance of risk-free debt in the
high state or by making all debt issued in the high state riskier. These are just two di⁄erent
ways of creating more informationally sensitive securities in normal times, which encourages
more investors to build infrastructure.
Figure 4 illustrates this point graphically by showing total surplus achieved by the planner
for various values of d:
H in a numerical example. The left panel shows that surplus is maximized
when the planner sets dH = d￿￿
H = $0:56 (the solid triangle) and fully funds all loan pools.
Surplus is decreasing to the left of d￿￿
H: lowering dH in this range increases the demand for
informed equity capital in the high state, but has no o⁄setting bene￿ts because there is no
underfunding in the low state to the left of d￿￿
H. Tranching cash ￿ ows into junior and senior
claims is valuable in the model. In its absence, too many investors would become informed.
However, the private market economizes too much, and the planner can intervene to improve the
outcome. Surplus is decreasing to the right of d￿￿
H because increasing dH reduces the demand for
informed capital, resulting in fewer investors becoming informed and leading to underfunding
in the low state.
The right panel shows that the planner can also achieve the maximal surplus by raising dH.
The private market equilibrium is given by dH = d￿
H = $0:99 (the solid circle) and the planner
can achieve full funding in the low state by setting dH = d￿￿
H = $0:994. Surplus decreases to
the right of d￿￿
H because further raising dH increases the adverse selection pro￿ts available to
informed investors in the secondary market, encouraging more investors than are necessary to
fund all loan pools in the low state to become informed at time 0. Surplus decreases to the
left of d￿￿
H because lowering dH reduces adverse selection pro￿ts, discouraging investors from
becoming informed and creating underfunding in the low state.
3.3.2 Private Market Ine¢ ciency
Note that the planner￿ s solution can only di⁄er from the private market equilibrium if informed
investors cannot capture the full surplus of loan pools in the low state. Formally, if rL =
(VL ￿ 1)=
￿
1 ￿ vB
L
￿
when informed capital is maximally scarce, it is impossible to simultaneously
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Figure 4: Surplus as a Function of High State Debt dH.
satisfy conditions (6) and (8). Intuitively, if informed investors can capture the full surplus in
the low state and this covers the costs of information infrastructure, then enough investors will
become informed to ensure that all pools are ￿nanced in the low state.
The key contribution of our paper is to formalize why originators and investors are unable
to overcome this ￿nancing friction themselves. Individual originators maximize their pro￿ts by
minimizing the total transfer to informed investors. Raising as much risk-free debt as possible
from the uninformed enables an individual originator to economize on costly informed capital.
Each originator takes the number of informed investors as ￿xed, perceiving no costs o⁄setting
this gain. By contrast, the planner is sensitive to the fact that originators￿collective use risk-
free debt in the high state a⁄ects the ex ante incentives of investors to become informed. Using
more risk-free debt in the high state causes fewer investors to become informed and leads to
greater underfunding in the low state. When condition (8) is met, the costs of underfunding in
the low state outweigh the bene￿ts of economizing on informed capital.
3.4 The Planner￿ s Problem: Debt Guarantees
Beyond the ex ante capital structure regulations analyzed above, the planner could also try to
increase the amount of debt ￿nancing used in the low state ex post. This would better leverage
the ￿xed amount of informed capital available, increasing the number of loan pools it can be
spread across. We consider an intervention where the planner can use debt guarantees, ￿nanced
by distortionary taxes, to increase the amount of risk-free debt that originators can sell. The
25Term Asset-backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) established by the Federal Reserve during
the recent ￿nancial crisis essentially served this purpose, providing non-recourse leverage to
sophisticated investors in securitizations.
The bene￿ts of such loan guarantees is an increase in the number of loan pools ￿nanced in
the low state. We assume that the costs of these guarantees are the distortions they create.
Speci￿cally the planner ￿nances the guarantees with taxes, which create deadweight loss 1
2￿￿2
when amount ￿ is raised. If the planner guarantees debt up to face value dL, she will have
to raise taxes to make a total of ￿ = (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
dL ￿ vB
L
￿
in guarantee payments, resulting in a
deadweight loss of 1
2￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
2 ￿
dL ￿ vB
L
￿2.
We continue to assume that condition (8) is met so that it is optimal for all loan pools to
be ￿nanced in the low state. The planner ￿rst sets the optimal dL and then adjusts dH so that
all loans pools can be ￿nanced in the low state (i.e., sets dH such that K [dH] = 1￿dL). Thus,
the planner￿ s objective function can be written as
p(VH ￿ 1) + (1 ￿ p)(VL ￿ 1) ￿ c(1 ￿ dL) ￿
1
2
(1 ￿ p)￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
2 ￿
dL ￿ v
B
L
￿2
:
The planner trades o⁄ the costs of additional informed capital against the distortionary costs
of debt guarantees. The optimal face value of guaranteed debt is given by
d
￿￿￿
L = v
B
L +
c
￿ (1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ ￿)
2: (9)
The planner￿ s solution can be summarized by the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Suppose that conditions (3), (6), (7), and (8) are satis￿ed. Then the planner￿ s
solution is a triple (K￿￿￿;d￿￿￿
H ;d￿￿￿
L ) such that: (i) d￿￿￿
L is given by (9); (ii) K￿￿￿ = 1￿d￿￿￿
L ; (iii)
d￿￿￿
H satis￿es (4) given K￿￿￿ and d￿￿￿
L ; and (iv) the number of projects undertaken is NH = 1 in
the high state and NL = 1 in the low state:
Corollary 1 The planner￿ s solution with debt guarantees approaches the planner￿ s solution
without guarantees as the distortionary costs of debt grow large: (K￿￿￿;d￿￿￿
H ;d￿￿￿
L ) ! (K￿￿;d￿￿
H;d￿￿
L )
as ￿ ! 1. Furthermore, there is a critical value ￿ such that for ￿ > ￿ the planner￿ s solution
involves a combination of debt limits and debt guarantees: d￿￿￿
H < d￿
H and K￿￿￿ > K￿.
The optimal level of guarantees equates the marginal deadweight cost of taxation with
the marginal cost of additional informed capital, c. An important distinction between using
guarantees ex post and regulating capital structure ex ante is that the costs of guarantees
are only borne in the low state, whereas the costs of additional informed capital are borne
unconditionally. Thus, ex post guarantees become more attractive as either p ! 1 so that
crises are extremely rare or as ￿ ! 1 so that guarantees are relatively inexpensive.
The planner always opts to guarantee some debt because there is no other taxation in this
economy. Thus, regardless of the value of ￿, the ￿rst dollar of taxation has marginal cost 0
26so that guarantees are initially quite appealing. In an economy where the level of taxation is
already high, the planner might not opt to use any debt guarantees. The corollary notes that
as taxation becomes increasingly expensive (i.e., as ￿ increases), the planner will rely less on
guarantees and more on altering dH.
4 Empirical Implications
In addition to our model, several other explanations have been advanced for the collapse of
securitization markets in the recent ￿nancial crisis. In this section, we discuss several empirical
implications that distinguish the mechanism in our model from these alternative explanations.
We also provide anecdotal evidence that our mechanism contributed to previous shutdowns of
markets for near-riskless securities.13
4.1 Fire Sales
Explanations of the 2007-2008 collapse of securitization emphasizing ￿re sales have received
signi￿cant attention in recent empirical and theoretical work.14 In ￿re-sale models, forced
liquidations by leveraged investors create attractive investment opportunities in the secondary
market, which draw capital away from the primary market. While forced liquidations are no
doubt an important source of market disruptions, our model shows that they need not be the
only source.
Fire-sale models imply very di⁄erent patterns of securities holdings and ￿ ows among in-
vestors than our model. In particular, a key implication of the ￿re-sales view is that aggregate
holdings should move from leveraged, sophisticated investors to unleveraged, unsophisticated
investors over the course of the ￿nancial crisis. In contrast, our model suggests that informed
investors should take on a bigger role in bad times as uninformed investors move to the side-
lines. It would be possible to distinguish between these two contrasting views using data on
the ABS holdings of various investor types through the crisis.
In practice, when markets for near-riskless securities shut down, anecdotal evidence sug-
gests that uninformed investors tend to withdraw, not step in. For instance, in the recent
crisis, the shutdown of the market for non-mortgage consumer credit (credit cards, auto loan,
and student loan) securitizations was not driven by investor losses. Instead, as o¢ cials from
the Federal Reserve described, ￿Investors became wary of all structured securities￿ because
they were ￿complex and heterogeneous and, thus, hard to value￿(Kohn 2009, Dudley 2009).
Similarly, when the market for collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs) collapsed in 1994,
13For more detail on these episodes, see the Internet Appendix.
14On the empirical side, see Gorton and Metrick (2010, 2011) and He, Khang, and Krishnamurthy (2010). On
the theoretical side, see Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), Davila (2011), Geanakopolos (2009), Stein (2012),
and Shleifer and Vishny (2010a,b).
27its demise was ascribed to uninformed investors who suddenly ￿[didn￿ t] want to have anything
to do with any structured mortgage product￿(Carroll and Lappen 1994).
4.2 Credit Ratings
Another set of accounts of the recent ￿nancial crisis emphasize investor over-reliance on credit
ratings. According to these accounts, many investors outsourced their credit analysis to the
credit rating agencies prior to the crisis, but then lost faith in credit ratings as many AAA-
securities su⁄ered downgrades in 2007 and 2008. Unable to analyze securities themselves, these
investors simply withdrew from the market.
These accounts correspond closely to the mechanism in our model. Investors who outsource
their analysis to rating agencies economize on the costs of information infrastructure, but
withdraw from the market when they lose faith in the rating agencies in bad times. In this
interpretation of the model, our results suggest that originators may rationally choose to issue
large quantities of highly-rated securities to outsourcing investors in good times, even if they
foresee the possibility that these investors will exit the market in bad times.
Problems with the credibility of credit ratings certainly played an important role in the
recent crisis. According to Federal Reserve o¢ cials, when ￿inadequate rigor on the part of
the rating agencies became apparent... an almost complete loss of investor appetite￿resulted
(Dudley 2009). In 2002, a similar dynamic had played out in the market for high-yield collat-
eralized debt obligations (CDOs). This market grew rapidly in the late 1990s and early 2000s
largely based on the participation of investors who did not ￿have the monitoring capabilities
to track their investments, or infrastructure to examine them on a regular basis￿(Pacelle and
Zuckerman 2001). It then collapsed in the run-up to the Worldcom default in July 2002, as
uninformed investors who did not have the ability to analyze CDOs withdrew once they lost
faith in credit ratings.
4.3 Neglected Risks
Our model also has implications that distinguish it from accounts that emphasize neglected
risks or mistakes by uninformed investors (see e.g., Coval, Jurek, and Sta⁄ord (2009a,b) and
Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny (2011)). Such accounts cannot explain recurring shutdowns
in markets for near-riskless securities without appealing to recurring mistakes, which may be
unlikely if sophisticated investors learn from mistakes. By contrast, our model suggests an
externality that can lead to recurring breakdowns in markets for near-riskless assets. And
while the recent ￿nancial crisis provides the most prominent example, markets for near-riskless
securities have su⁄ered numerous shutdowns in the last 40 years, including the collapses of the
high-yield CDO market in 2002 and the CMO market in 1994 as described above, as well as the
runs on asset-backed commercial paper market in 2007 and the non￿nancial commercial paper
market after the Penn Central default in 1970.
28Identifying a clear market failure and regulations to address it is an important step in terms
of normative analysis. However, it is not our intention to suggest that mistakes did not play a
role in the recent crisis. Indeed, if uninformed investors neglect certain risks in normal times,
this would likely exacerbate the basic ine¢ ciency in our model. Speci￿cally, such mispricing
would make ￿nancing from uninformed investors even more attractive to issuers in good times,
leading to even greater underinvestment in information infrastructure by investors.
5 Conclusion
We present a model in which too many informationally insensitive securities are issued in
good times. The model has two key ingredients. First, there is a wedge between the social and
private returns to information production infrastructure. Second, the information infrastructure
of investors is ￿xed in the short run.
When combined, these ingredients result in a world where individual originators rationally
economize on ￿nancing costs in good times by issuing large amounts of informationally insensi-
tive securities to uninformed investors. This reduces the returns that informed investors earn in
good times, endogenously resulting in a lack of information production infrastructure. In bad
times when the amount of ￿nancing that can be raised from uninformed investors drops, there
may be insu¢ cient informed capital, and positive NPV loans may go unfunded. Securitization
is valuable in helping to economize on information production costs, but the private market
goes too far, resulting in a market that is overly fragile.
Thus, our model suggests that it might be desirable to regulate the capital structures of
securitization trusts. Similar to bank capital requirements, such regulation might stipulate
that no more than 50% of the securities backed by a given pool could be rated AAA or AA.
This might be done by having AAA-rated senior debt comprise less than 50% of the pool and
making the next tranche large enough so that it is rated below AA. This would correspond to
the planner lowering dH in our model. Alternatively, the senior-most tranche could be very
large so that it is rated below AA, which would correspond to the planner raising dH in the
model.
More broadly, our approach highlights that the infrastructure and organization of profes-
sional investors is in part determined by the menu of securities o⁄ered by originators. Since
robust infrastructure is a public good from the standpoint of originators, it may be underpro-
vided in the private market equilibrium. The individually rational decisions of originators may
lead to an infrastructure that is overly prone to disruptions in bad times. Policies regulating
originator capital structure decisions may help promote a more robust market infrastructure.
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32A Microfounding the Market Power of the Informed
In the main text, we assume that the return earned by informed investors is a function of their
scarcity: rS = r[K;eS] where eS = 1 ￿ P [dS;D] is originators demand for equity. We assumed
that r[￿] has three properties:
1. Returns to informed capital exceed c when it is maximally scarce: r[K;eS] > c when
K ￿ eS.
2. Informed capital earns a higher return when it is more scarce: @r=@K < 0 and @ (r[K;e] ￿ e)=@e >
0.
3. There is a ￿nancing friction that prevents informed investors from capturing the full
surplus associated with loan pools even when they are maximally scarce: rL < (VL ￿ 1)=eL
where VL = ￿vG+(1 ￿ ￿)vB
L the expected value of the average loan pool in the low state.
A.1 Walrasian Pricing
If we assume Walrasian pricing, then we will have r[K;eS] = 0 when K > eS and r[K;eS] =
(1 ￿ w)(VS ￿ 1)=eS when K ￿ eS. Here 0 < w < 1 is the ￿nancing wedge; informed investors
can only capture fraction (1 ￿ w) of the loan pool surplus even when they are maximally scarce.
Now condition (6) in the main text reduces to
(1 ￿ p) ￿ r[1 ￿ d
￿
L;1 ￿ d
￿
L] = (1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ w)(VL ￿ 1)=
￿
1 ￿ v
B
L
￿
< c:
If this condition is met, then if 1￿vB
L investors (enough to fund all loan pools in the low state)
become informed, they will not earn enough to recoup their infrastructure costs. In this case,
then exactly 1￿vB
H investors become informed and there will be underfunding in the low state.
The planner then can set d￿￿
H = vB
L to ensure that all projects are funded in the low state.
Social welfare is greater in the planner￿ s solution than the private market outcome if
p(VH ￿ 1) + (1 ￿ p)
1 ￿ vB
H
1 ￿ vB
L
(VL ￿ 1) ￿ c
￿
1 ￿ v
B
H
￿
< p(VH ￿ 1) + (1 ￿ p)(VL ￿ 1) ￿ c
￿
1 ￿ v
B
L
￿
which reduces to the familiar condition (1 ￿ p)(VL ￿ 1)=
￿
1 ￿ vB
L
￿
> c.
A.2 Search Version
To obtain returns that are continuous in the scarcity of informed investors, we use a variant
of the search/bargaining model of Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985). Let the discount rate be
￿. In our case, the mass of originators (i.e., potential sellers) is eS and the mass of informed
investors (i.e., potential buyers) is K, so the fraction of buyers is ￿ = K=(K + eS). Investors
and originators bargain over the fraction of total surplus (VS ￿ 1) that each will receive, with
the originator receiving fraction ￿ and the investor receiving fraction 1 ￿ ￿. The rate at which
investors meet originators is proportional to the number of originators, ￿(1 ￿ ￿), and the rate
at which originators meet investors is proportional to the number of investors, ￿￿, for some
exogenous contact rate ￿.
33Let WI and WO be the value functions for investors and originators at the beginning of the
game. Given a bargaining outcome ￿, these can be written as
￿WI = ￿(1 ￿ ￿)((1 ￿ ￿) ￿ WI) (10)
￿WO = ￿￿(￿ ￿ WO): (11)
In the bargaining game, either the investor or originator is randomly chosen and o⁄ers a division,
￿. If there is no agreement, the investor and originator wait for interval ￿ and then one is
randomly selected and o⁄ers another division. However, in interval ￿ either party can meet a
new bargaining partner and leave the current negotiation. One can show that as ￿ ! 0, the
subgame perfect equilibrium in the game is given by the Nash bargaining solution with WI and
WO as the threat points.15 Thus, ￿ maximizes (￿ ￿ WO)(1 ￿ ￿ ￿ WI); so we have
￿ =
1
2
(1 + WO ￿ WI): (12)
In equilibrium, we have ￿ = ￿ and solving (10), (11), and (12) for ￿ yields
￿ =
￿ + ￿￿
￿ + 2￿
: (13)
Taking the limit as ￿ ! 0 yields ￿ = ￿.
Thus, the informed investors (buyers) capture fraction (1 ￿ ￿) = (1 ￿ ￿) = eS=(K + eS)
of the surplus. This fraction is decreasing in K and increasing in eS, the amount of equity
￿nancing backing each project. The informed investors (buyers) capture (1 ￿ ￿) of the surplus
(VS ￿ 1) in return for an investment of eS, so the return they earn per dollar invested is
rS = (1 ￿ ￿)
(VS ￿ 1)
eS
=
VS ￿ 1
K + eS
:
Note that
rS =
VS ￿ 1
K + eS
<
VS ￿ 1
eS
so long as K > 0. Furthermore, note that @rS [K;eS]=@K < 0 and @rS [K;eS]=@eS < 0. The
total dollar return earned by the informed per pool is
rS [K;eS] ￿ eS = (1 ￿ ￿)(VS ￿ 1) =
eS
K + eS
(VS ￿ 1)
which is increasing in eS and decreasing in K. Thus, rS [K;(1 ￿ P [D;dS])] ￿ (1 ￿ P [D;dS]) is
decreasing in dS.16 Thus, properties 2 and 3 of the return function assumed in the main text
follow from this simple model of search/bargaining.
15As ￿ ! 0, the prices proposed by the buyer and seller converge to the same limit.
16This model also implies that the return earned by uninformed investors is 0 since the mass of buyers
(uninformed investors) is in￿nite and the mass of sellers is ￿nite.
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B.1 Proof of Proposition 1
We ￿rst show that the originator￿ s problem is equivalent to maximizing P [dS;E]+P [dS;D]. Let
VE [dS] = (1 + rS)￿P [dS;E] be the value the equity of the loan pool. To raise 1￿P [dS;D] dollars
from informed equity investors, the originator must sell fraction (1￿P [dS;D])(1 + rS)=VE [dS]
of the equity in the pool. Thus, the value of the stake retained by the originator is
VE [dS]
￿
1 ￿
(1 ￿ P [dS;D])(1 + rS)
VE [dS]
￿
= (1 + rS)(P [dS;E] + P [dS;D] ￿ 1):
Since originators take rS as ￿xed, this is equivalent to maximizing P [dS;E] + P [dS;D]:
We next show that (as assumed in the text) that only uninformed investors purchase debt
in primary markets and that only informed investors purchase equity. First, uninformed in-
vestors would be willing to pay ￿
￿
1 ￿ M‘(M + ‘)
￿1￿￿
vG ￿ vB
S
￿
for equity claims, while in-
formed investors are willing to pay ￿
￿
vG ￿ vB
S
￿
=(1 + rS). Since (3) implies 1￿M‘(M + ‘)
￿1 <
1=(1 + rS), informed investors have higher valuations and, thus, only informed investors pur-
chase equity.
We now provide conditions under which only uninformed investors purchase debt. Recall
that the uninformed value risky debt according to
P [D;dS] = ￿min
￿
v
G;dS
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿)min
￿
v
B
S ;dS
￿
￿ ￿‘
M
M + ‘
￿
min
￿
v
G;dS
￿
￿ min
￿
v
B
S ;dS
￿￿
:
How do the informed value risky debt? Since they will opportunistically sell any bad pools
when not hit by liquidity shocks we have
VI [D;dS] =
Good pool, no liquidity shock
z }| {
￿(1 ￿ ‘)min
￿
v
G;dS
￿
+
Good pool, forced sale
z }| {
￿‘P2 [dS;D] +
Bad pool
z }| {
(1 ￿ ￿)P2 [dS;D]
= ￿min
￿
v
G;dS
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿)min
￿
v
B
S ;dS
￿
￿￿‘
M ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ‘)
M + ‘
￿
min
￿
v
G;dS
￿
￿ min
￿
v
B
S ;dS
￿￿
:
Due to their ability to opportunistically unload bad pools at t = 2, the informed have a weakly
higher valuation of debt and a strictly higher valuation of risky debt (i.e., when min
￿
vG;dS
￿
￿
min
￿
vB
S ;dS
￿
> 0). Thus, by deviating from the proposed equilibrium and purchasing risky
debt at the market price the informed can earn a certain return of
VI [D;dS] ￿ P [D;dS]
P [D;dS]
= ￿‘
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ‘)
M + ‘
min
￿
vG;dS
￿
￿ min
￿
vB
S ;dS
￿
P [D;dS]
= ￿‘(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ‘)
min
￿
vG;dS
￿
￿ min
￿
vB
S ;dS
￿
(M (1 ￿ ‘) + ‘)￿(minfvG;dSg ￿ minfvB
S ;dSg) + (M + ‘)minfvB
S ;dSg
By contrast if they participate in the primary equity market they will earn a return of rS with
35probability (1 ￿ P [D;dS])=K. As a result, the informed will use all of their capital to purchase
equity if
￿‘
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ‘)
M + ‘
min
￿
vG;dS
￿
￿ min
￿
vB
S ;dS
￿
P [D;dS]
< rS ￿
(1 ￿ P [D;dS])
K
. (14)
Obviously, this condition holds at the private market equilibrium where dS = vB
S and rS > 0.
Otherwise, the condition is non-trivial and primary market separation need not always ob-
tain when debt is risky. However, the condition will always hold for M su¢ ciently large
and we assume that this is the case. Speci￿cally, as M ! 1, secondary prices converge
to min
￿
vB
S ;dS
￿
which eliminates that ability of the informed to pro￿t from opportunistic sec-
ondary sales, so both P [D;dS] and VI [D;dS] converge to ￿min
￿
vG;dS
￿
+(1 ￿ ￿)min
￿
vB
S ;dS
￿
￿
￿‘
￿
min
￿
vG;dS
￿
￿ min
￿
vB
S ;dS
￿￿
. As a result, the left-hand-side of (14) converges to 0 while
the right-hand-side of (14) remains positive. Thus, the analysis in the main text implicitly
assumes that M is large enough so that (14) holds.
Finally, the fact that K￿ < 1 ￿ d￿
L follows from condition (6), the zero-pro￿t condition of
the informed (4), and the continuity of the scarcity returns earned by the informed r[￿].
B.2 Proof of Proposition 2
We ￿rst show that total originator surplus can be written as
pNH (VH ￿ 1) + (1 ￿ p)NL (VL ￿ 1) ￿ cK:
The pro￿ts of originators are given by
pNH (1 + rH)(P [dH;E] + P [dH;D] ￿ 1)
+(1 ￿ p)NL (1 + rL)(P [dL;E] + P [dL;D] ￿ 1):
The pro￿ts of uninformed investors are given by
pNH ((1 ￿ ‘)E [minfvH;dHg] + ‘P2 [dH;D] ￿ P [dH;D])
+(1 ￿ p)NL ((1 ￿ ‘)E [minfvL;dLg] + ‘P2 [dL;D] ￿ P [dL;D]):
The pro￿ts of informed investors are given by
p
￿
NHrH (1 ￿ P [dH;D]) +
M
M + ‘
‘￿
￿
min
￿
v
G;dH
￿
￿ min
￿
v
B
S ;dH
￿￿
￿
+(1 ￿ p)
￿
NLrL (1 ￿ P [dL;D])
M
M + ‘
‘￿
￿
min
￿
v
G;dL
￿
￿ min
￿
v
B
S ;dL
￿￿￿
￿ cK:
Summing yields pNH (VH ￿ 1)+(1 ￿ p)NL (VL ￿ 1)￿cK as desired. Since investor and market
maker pro￿ts are zero it follows that total social surplus equals to originator surplus.
As discussed in the text, we will always have NH = 1 since r > c when informed investors
are maximally scarce. Enough investors become informed to fund all loan pools in the high
state. Now de￿ne K [dH] implicitly using the zero pro￿t condition (4) and use the relation
36NL = K [dH]=
￿
1 ￿ vB
L
￿
to write total surplus as
p(VH ￿ 1) + (1 ￿ p)
K [dH]
1 ￿ vB
L
(VL ￿ 1) ￿ cK [dH]:
Di⁄erentiating with respect to dH yields
￿
(1 ￿ p)
VL ￿ 1
1 ￿ vB
L
￿ c
￿
@K
@dH
:
Write the zero pro￿t condition of the informed as 0 = ￿(K;dH;d￿
L [K]). Then we have
sign(@K￿=@dS) = sign(￿(@￿=@dH)=(@￿=@K)) = sign(@￿H=@dH). So to sign @K=@dH, we
only need to sign @￿H=@dH. Assuming NH = 1, we have
@￿H
@dH
=
<0 z }| {
@
@dH
[rH [K;(1 ￿ P [dH;D])](1 ￿ P [dH;D])] +
￿0 z }| {
M
M + ‘
‘￿
￿
1
￿
dH > v
B
H
￿
￿ 1
￿
dH > v
G￿￿
.
For dH < vB
H, the second term is zero so we have @￿H=@dH < 0. Thus, for dH < vB
H we will
have @K=@dH < 0, so the planner will be able to increase total surplus by decreasing dH so
long as condition (8) holds.
Note that the planner can achieve full funding in the low state using such interventions.
Speci￿cally, if the planner were to set d￿￿
H = d￿
L = vB
L, at least 1 ￿ vB
L investors would become
informed because they would be maximally scarce in both states and earn returns greater than c.
The planner can do better and will set d￿￿
H such that d￿
L < d￿￿
H < d￿
H and K￿￿ = K [d￿￿
H] = 1￿vB
L
so all loan pools are funded in the low state. We also need to check that uninformed investors
have a lower valuation for equity than informed investors at d￿￿
H. This generally will be the case
because condition (3) holds at the private market solution. The entry of informed capital o⁄sets
the increased demand for informed capital when we move from the private market solution to
the planner￿ s solution so r[K￿￿;1 ￿ d￿￿
H] will be similar to r[K￿;1 ￿ d￿
H].
B.3 Proof of Proposition 3
When vB
H < dH < vG we have
@￿H
@dH
= (1 ￿ P [dH;D])
@rH
@dH
￿ ￿rH
￿
1 ￿
M
M + ‘
‘
￿
+
M
M + ‘
‘￿.
The sum of the last two terms is greater than zero when condition (3) holds, i.e. exactly
when the originators want to issue risk-free debt. Thus, if we also have @rH=@eH < 0 so
that @rH=@dH > 0, as is the case in the search model outlined in Appendix A, (3) ensures
that we always have @￿H=@dH > 0 for vB
H < dH < vG. However, if @rH=@dH < 0, as in
the numerical example in Section 2.3, then the sign of @￿H=@dH > 0 would depend on the
magnitude of @rH=@dH. Speci￿cally, if @rH=@dH < 0, then (3) is only a necessary condition to
have @￿H=@dH > 0.
37More generally, we have @￿H=@dH > 0 when
@rH
@dH
> ￿(1 ￿ P [dH;D])
￿1 ￿
1 + rH
￿
M
M + ‘
‘ ￿
￿
1 ￿
1
1 + rH
￿￿
:
When (3) holds, the right hand side of this inequality is negative. So raising the face value of
debt increases the number of informed investors so long as @rH=@dH is not too negative.
When the planner can encourage investors to become informed by raising dH to make the
debt riskier, the fact that originators only need to raise $1 is a constraint on such interventions.
Speci￿cally, the planner cannot force originators to raise more than $1 of total ￿nancing. Thus,
the planner can only raise dH to the point where the price of debt equals 1. When raising dH
the planner is subject to the constraint that P [dH;D] ￿ 1. Thus, for vB
H < dH < vG, the
maximum value of dH satis￿es
1 = ￿dH + (1 ￿ ￿)v
B
H ￿ ￿‘M (M + ‘)
￿1 ￿
dH ￿ v
B
H
￿
) dH = v
B
H +
1 ￿ vB
H
￿
￿
1 ￿ ‘M (M + ‘)
￿1￿:
This value of dH yields [‘M=(M (1 ￿ ‘) + ‘)]
￿
1 ￿ vB
H
￿
of adverse selection pro￿ts for the in-
formed in the good state.
To achieve full funding of loan pools in the low state, the planner must induce K = 1 ￿ vB
L
informed investors to enter. The zero pro￿t condition for the informed would then be
p
￿
rH (1 ￿ P [dH;D]) +
M
M + ‘
‘￿
￿
min
￿
v
G;dH
￿
￿ min
￿
v
B
S ;dH
￿￿￿
+(1 ￿ p)rL
￿
1 ￿ v
B
L
￿
= c
￿
1 ￿ v
B
L
￿
:
If
‘M
M (1 ￿ ‘) + ‘
￿
1 ￿ v
B
H
￿
| {z }
maximum adverse selection pro￿ts
> c
￿
1 ￿ v
B
L
￿
,
then the fact that r > c when informed capital is maximally scarce implies that (1 ￿ p)rL
￿
1 ￿ vB
L
￿
>
(1 ￿ p)c
￿
1 ￿ vB
L
￿
, so there is a feasible value of dH that satis￿es this zero pro￿t condition.
The left hand side of this expression gives the maximum adverse selection pro￿ts for the
informed in the high state for the value of dH such that P [dH;D] = 1. The right hand side is
the information infrastructure cost needed to fully fund all loan pools in the low state. However,
as discussed above, 1 ￿ vB
H is likely to be small since the scope for adverse selection is low in
good times. So this condition may be di¢ cult to satisfy. Intuitively, the planner is trying to
subsidize information production by creating more adverse selection, but it may be di¢ cult to
create enough adverse selection in good times to achieve the optimal subsidy level.
B.4 Proof of Proposition 4
We have
d
￿￿￿
L = v
B
L +
c
￿ (1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ ￿)
2:
Note that d￿￿￿
H is a function of d￿￿￿
L and K￿￿￿ is a function of d￿￿￿
H . Since d￿￿￿
L ! d￿￿
L as ! 1;
we will have d￿￿￿
H ! d￿￿
H and K￿￿￿ ! K￿￿ as well. The existence of ￿ is a consequence of the
continuity of the triple (K￿￿￿;d￿￿￿
H ;d￿￿￿
L ) in ￿ and the fact that d￿￿
H < d￿
H and K￿￿ > K￿.
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